|
USERRA,
VEOA, and VETERANS’ RIGHTS
Lourens
v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 193 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
The
Board’s jurisdiction under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) does not extend to spouses and widows of members
of the uniformed service.
Tindall
v. Department of the Army,
84 M.S.P.R. 230 (1999)
The
appellant’s claim that the agency did not consider the fact that he was
a 5-point preference eligible in its hiring decision did not state a claim
under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)
because he was not claiming that he was denied a benefit based on his prior
military service. However, for purposes of USERRA, the appellant’s service
in the Army Reserve qualifies as "service in the uniformed services" (38
U.S.C. § 4303(13), (16)), and his claim of nonselection in favor of
a nonreservist states a claim under USERRA.
Spigner
v. Department of the Air Force, 86 M.S.P.R. 677 (2000)
This
decision discussed the rules under the Veterans Employment Opportunities
Act (VEOA) as they apply to a veteran’s rights in connection with appointments.
In its decision, the Board noted, inter alia, that under 5 C.F.R.
§ 333.201, "preference shall be given first to preference eligibles
with compensable service-connected disability of 10 percent or more, and
second to other preference eligibles," and that a preference eligible is
not entitled to selection, but is only entitled to as much preference as
he would have received in a competitive examination. No VEOA violation
was found where a 5-point preference eligible was selected for a vacancy
over the appellant, a 10-point eligible.
Fernandez
v. Department of the Army, 234 F.3d 553 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
The
Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998 did not make the substantive
provisions of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act (USERRA) retroactive. The Board’s authority is limited to enforcing
an employee’s rights as they existed at the time the claim accrued.
Brown
v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
247 F.3d 1222 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
Veterans
are not accorded any preference under the Veterans’ Preference Act when
seeking promotions or intra-agency transfers.
Sheehan
v. Department of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
An
employee making a discrimination claim under USERRA bears the initial burden
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee’s military
service was "a substantial or motivating factor" in an adverse employment
action. Motivation or intent may be proven by either direct or circumstantial
evidence. If the employee meets this burden, the employer then has the
opportunity to come forward with evidence to show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the employer would have taken the adverse action anyway,
for a valid reason.
Milner
v. Department of Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 660 (2001)
An
appellant’s right to a hearing in a Board appeal qualifies as a "benefit
of employment" under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (USERRA). Such a benefit may not be denied to a person because
of military service, so a refusal to reschedule a hearing if the appellant
exercised a protected right under USERRA would violate the spirit if not
the letter of USERRA. This case also holds that "to effectuate the USERRA
statutory scheme … a USERRA case that has been dismissed without prejudice
to refiling will be considered automatically refiled by the date set forth
in the dismissal order, unless there is evidence that the appellant has
abandoned the case."
Fox
v. United States Postal Service, 88 M.S.P.R. 381 (2001)
The
burden of proof in USERRA cases, as clarified in Sheehan v. Navy,
240 F.3d 1009, was discussed. Rather than a Title VII burden being appropriate,
"in USERRA actions there must be an initial showing by the employee that
military status was at least a motivating or substantial factor in the
agency action, upon which the agency must prove, by a preponderance of
evidence, that the action would have been taken despite the protected status."
Based on this holding, the Board overruled its own decisions to the extent
they conflict on the burden of proof issue.
Eberhart
v. United States Postal Service, 88 M.S.P.R. 398 (2001)
The
Postal Service is a "Federal executive agency" whose actions are covered
by USERRA, and Board jurisdiction under USERRA includes the denial of a
request for reassignment to a position in a different location, whether
the employee can show that he has a right to such a reassignment or not.
Augustine
v. Department of Veterans Affairs & Office of Personnel Management,
88 M.S.P.R. 407 (2001)
Although
this decision does not resolve the issues of the appeal, it both sets out
the showing required to prove jurisdiction under the Veterans Employment
Opportunities Act (VEOA) and discusses how veterans’ preference operates
in filling competitive service jobs, most specifically 5 U.S.C. §§
3112 and 3304. The decision then requests briefs on several issues necessary
to a final decision in the appeal.
Rogers
v. Department of the Army, 88 M.S.P.R. 610 (2001)
This
case examined an agency’s USERRA obligation under 5 CFR 353.209(a), which
provides that an employee may not be demoted or separated while on duty
with the uniformed services except for cause. Thus, if the appellant’s
position is abolished during his absence, the agency must reassign him
to another position of like status and pay, and because a detail is temporary,
it does not fulfill the agency’s USERRA obligation. The agency must reassign
him regardless of the absence of any recruitment efforts. Further, in this
case, as a result of the agency’s failure to reassign the appellant, he
was subject to a second RIF action, in lieu of which he retired. Under
these circumstances, the Board found that he had been coerced into retirement
by the agency’s violation of his USERRA rights.
Metzenbaum
v. Department of Justice, 89 M.S.P.R. 285 (2001)
The
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remanded this case
to the Board for consideration of whether, pursuant to Board regulations,
appellants in USERRA-based appeals may bring "mixed cases" before the Board,
that is, affirmative defenses alleging discrimination on the basis of disability
or any of the other types of discrimination covered by 5 U.S.C. §
7702(a)(1). See 240 F.3d 1068 (2001). The Board examined the language
and stated statutory purpose of USERRA in deciding the issue and reaffirmed
its earlier determination, first set forth in Bodus v. Department of
the Air Force, 82 M.S.P.R. 508, that it lacks authority to reach such
additional claims. Nor does Board authority allow for a decision on the
merits of the underlying matter except to the extent necessary to address
the appellant’s military status discrimination allegations, it held.
Ruffin
v. Department of the Treasury, 89 M.S.P.R. 396 (2001)
Under
the VEOA, 5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1), (d), a preference eligible who alleges
that an agency violated his rights under any statute or regulation relating
to veterans’ preference, and who has exhausted his rights under that section
before the Secretary of Labor, may file an appeal with the Board. This
case decides the question of the extent of the Board’s authority in such
an appeal. The Board held that it lacks authority in a VEOA appeal to consider
the merits of the personnel action at issue and any claims of discrimination
covered under 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1). Rather, its authority is limited
to the claim of violation of the appellant’s veterans’ preference rights.
USERRA,
VEOA, and VETERANS’ RIGHTS
|