Maurer, et al. v. Office of Personnel Management, 84 M.S.P.R. 156 (1999)
The decision in this appeal examines the complex of statutory provisions necessary to determine the proper disposition of excess contributions, that is, the contributions to the retirement system made by an employee who has worked beyond the point of maximum return, at which his annuity could no longer be increased by additional deductions (41 years, 11 months under CSRS).
 

Hall v. Office of Personnel Management, 85 M.S.P.R. 371 (2000)
This decision notes the rule that an agency has a duty under 5 C.F.R. § 844.202 to apply for disability retirement for an employee before issuing a decision to remove her for cause when it concludes that she is incapable of deciding to file, but modifies Carillo v. OPM, 82 M.S.P.R. 61, by noting that both the CSRS and FERS regulations contemplate that an employing agency should effect its removal decision when it applies for disability retirement on the appellant’s behalf, and then provide the documentation of the separation to OPM.
 

Rule v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 85 M.S.P.R. 388 (2000)
The holding in Nordhoff v. Navy, 78 M.S.P.R. 88, the case that sets the jurisdictional standard as to an appellant who claims to have been constructively removed through an involuntary disability retirement, was restated. After setting out the distinctions between "accommodation" for purposes of disability retirement and the Rehabilitation Act, the Board clarified Nordhoff to hold that an appellant can establish jurisdiction over a disability retirement if he can prove that there was an accommodation available on the date of his separation, either at or below his grade or level, that would have allowed him to continue his employment. He must establish, however, that he indicated to the agency that he wished to continue working despite his medical limitations.
 

Watson, et al. v. Department of the Navy, 86 M.S.P.R. 318 (2000)
The Board clarified the rules that apply to the adjudication of law enforcement officer (LEO) retirement coverage. It stated that OPM’s regulations mandate a "position-oriented" approach. That approach more affirmatively takes into account the basic reasons for the existence of the position, and if it was not created for the purpose of investigation, apprehension, or detention, then the incumbents of the position would not be entitled to LEO credit.
 

Billinger v. Office of Personnel Management, 206 F.3d 1404 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
A congressional employee was eligible to receive credit for his unused sick leave under the Civil Service Retirement System where the leave was accumulated under a "formal leave system" consisting of written rules. Where OPM relies on an employing agency certification that affects an employee’s rights under the CSRS, the certification is reviewable by the Board.
 

Dick v. Office of Personnel Management, 216 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
A Federal employee is not entitled to reinstatement of his prior disability annuity if his disability recurs after his employment has ended.
 

Pitsker v. Office of Personnel Management, 234 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
Federal law enforcement officers (LEOs) who retire on disability before they reach 50 years of age are nevertheless entitled to receive enhanced annuities under 5 U.S.C. § 8339(d)(1). The court declined to adopt OPM’s interpretation of the statute because it was unpersuasive and would cause absurd results.
 

Watson v. Department of the Navy, 262 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
Under a legally correct construction of the statutes and regulations, a Federal police officer seeking LEO early retirement credit must prove that he or she occupied a position that primarily required the investigation, apprehension, or detention of criminals or suspects, rather than merely the protection of life or property, and that the duties of the position were so physically demanding as to necessitate his or her retirement at an unusually early age.
 

Wallace v. Office of Personnel Management, 88 M.S.P.R. 375 (2001)
This is the Board’s first examination of the Federal Erroneous Retirement Coverage Corrections Act (FERCCA), Pub. L. No. 106-265, which was signed into law on September 19, 2000. Generally, it provides for the correction of retirement coverage errors for employees who were in the wrong system for a minimum of three years after December 31, 1986. The Board found that it applies to this appellant’s case and directed OPM to provide him written notice of the error and an opportunity to elect CSRS-Offset coverage or FERS coverage, effective as of the date of that error. The appellant must then make his election within six months of receipt of that notice.
 

Treziok v. Office of Personnel Management, 89 M.S.P.R. 361 (2001)
In a disability retirement appeal, where the position description and medical evidence unambiguously and without contradiction indicate that the appellant cannot perform the duties or meet the requirements of the position, the Board may link the medical evidence to the duties and requirements and find that he is entitled to disability retirement. The appellant’s failure to submit objective medical evidence cannot be the sole reason for denying him disability retirement. Thus, where there is no cure or specific treatment for Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS), and the appellant’s depression is related to the CFS, the Board found that his failure to seek psychiatric help does not preclude him from receiving disability retirement. The Board therefore found the appellant was entitled to disability retirement even absent a doctor’s specific link between the appellant’s medical/mental conditions and the specific duties of his job.
 

Redmond v. Office of Personnel Management, 90 M.S.P.R. 4 (2001)
This case examines the impact of an award of Social Security Administration benefits on a FERS disability retirement applicant. It first notes that where SSA arranged an examination of the appellant, the results are not disclosed except under the Freedom of Information Act, so that when the SSA award was submitted for the first time on petition for review, it constituted new evidence. On the merits, the decision reiterates that while the award of SSA benefits does not require the award of a FERS disability annuity, that award must be considered. Further, under SSA regulations, 20 CFR 404.1527(f)(2)(i), an SSA medical consultant is defined as a "highly qualified physician." Here, the Board concluded that the appellant, who had received a disability award from SSA based on the examinations of a doctor and a vocational expert, was also entitled to a FERS disability retirement. In so holding, the Board pointed to the recency and depth of the experts’ opinions, along with the evidence before OPM and the testimony at the hearing.
 

Clark v OPM, Fed. Cir. No. 00-3239, July 19, 2001.  The estate of the deceased husband of a deceased Federal employee sought to receive the death benefits to which the surviving spouse of a Federal employee is entitled.  The background of the case was that the husband had killed his wife in a child custody dispute, and then committed suicide.  OPM denied the death benefits, citing the principle that it is against public policy to permit an individual to profit from his or her wrongdoing.  OPM also relied on applicable law in the relevant state (Alabama) which prohibited such payment under the circumstances.  The Court affirmed OPM's decision.
 

Street v Navy, DC0842000210-I-1, January 10, 2002.  Relying Federal Circuit’s decision in Watson v Navy, the Board concluded that in determining an employee’s eligibility for Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) service credit, the analysis should focus first on whether the “primary duties” of the position are LEO type duties.  Primary duties are those which are paramount in influence or weight; that is, constitute the basic reasons for the existence of the position.   The Board held that focusing on the extent to which such duties occupy a substantial portion of an individual’s working time places too much emphasis on the day-to-day activities of an individual during a limited period of time.  Here the Board found the several appellants were not eligible for LEO service credit.