Daigle v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 84 M.S.P.R. 625 (1999)
In Chapter 43 actions, the Board has required agencies since 1984 to produce evidence that OPM approved their performance appraisal systems. However, given the passage of time, the Board’s unawareness of any agency that had not received OPM’s approval, and the absence of a statutory requirement for renewing approval of a system once in place, the Board revisited the issue and held that "it is no longer necessary to perpetuate an outmoded paperwork requirement." Thus, agencies are no longer required to submit evidence of proof of OPM approval if the issue is not raised by the appellant.
 

Diprizio v Transportation, 88 MSPR 78, March 19, 2001.  An AJ found that the employee’s generic performance standards were impermissibly vague.  The full Board, reading the generic standards together with the appellant’s critical elements, and considering the context the agency gave the standards by counseling the employee, found that the standards were not impermissible vague.  The Board stated: “any lack of specificity inherent in the performance standards was cured by the agency’s providing the appellant with clear guidance during the PIP as to what was expected of him.”  The case was remanded back for further adjudication to determine whether the agency proved that the appellant’s performance was unacceptable. 
 

Thomas v Navy, 89 MSPR 188, August 2, 2001.  The Board reversed an initial decision which found that the agency had established performance standards which were both absolute and too vague.  The Board held that the agency had, prior to and during the performance improvement period, described in detail what was expected and how errors in performance would be calculated.  It stated that "an agency may cure otherwise fatal defects in the development and communication of performance standards by communicating sufficient information regarding performance requirements at the beginning of --and even during -- the PIP."  It went on to reject the administrative judge's reliance on the number of opportunities an employee has to make errors as the basis for determining whether a numerical limit on errors is reasonable.